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A gender history of Hungarian intelligence services during 
the Cold War
Andrea Pető
Department of Gender Studies, Central European University, CEU, Budapest, Hungary
ABSTRACT
Based on the examination of the positions and activities of women 
employees from the interwar period until the 1980s in the acces-
sible archival sources of Hungarian intelligence services, this paper 
claims that since in intelligence women employees have been 
deployed as “controlling images” of men. It argues that for 
women, the intelligence service sector is just like any other paid 
employment: with time, women were gradually integrated in it; and 
the level of their involvement reflected the level of women's eman-
cipation in the given society. Women working for the intelligence 
services had to counter workplace discrimination just like any other 
female employee in more ordinary jobs. However, intelligence work 
has an additional special feature: sexism and gender-based discri-
mination are intrinsic parts of it, because the deployment of femi-
ninity as “Otherness” is part and parcel of the trade and the result of 
deliberate methodological decisions.
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‘Das Nachrichtendienst ist ein Herrendienst’ – supposedly this bon mot comes from the 
legendary chief of the Abwehr, the Third Reich’s military intelligence service, Admiral 
Wilhelm Canaris (1887–1945) ‘Intelligence is inherently a noble service’ or ‘Intelligence 
is gentlemen’s service’ which first conceals that intelligence is men’s profession, 
the second that it is a profession; not a service, and hence essentially hierarchical. In 
sum, intelligence is defined as service and not as a profession of select elite men, who are 
aware of what it means to be chosen, and who offer special services to the state not 
necessarily for a fee. There are particular challenges when one would like to answer to the 
traditional question raised by gender history namely ‘where were the women’ in case of 
the intelligence services. Not only are archival sources difficult to access as it is often the 
case with documents of intelligence services, but the framework in which women are 
being discussed there as agents, field officers or subjects of intelligence gathering, if 
discussed at all, requires special theoretical considerations. The list of challenges do not 
end there. Analyzing women in intelligence services in a country of the Soviet Block, 
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namely Hungary, which seemingly promoted women’s emancipation at that time also 
poses special theoretical and methodological challenges.
In what follows, first I will analyze theoretical issue of gendering the history of 
intelligence gathering with introducing the concept of ‘controlling images’. Second 
after an overview of the available archival sources about gendering history of 
Hungarian intelligence services (civil and military), I will map how in Hungary the 
profession institutionally integrated women as employees: agents and officers, in national 
and international as well as military data acquisition and as subjects of data gathering 
based on the gender politics of the training manuals. In the conclusion, argue that we can 
gain otherwise unobtainable insights from a gender sensitive analysis of intelligence work 
during Cold War.
Theoretical framework: ‘controlling images’
The term controlling image was developed by Patricia Hill Collins and refers to an image 
that naturalizes and normalizes sexism and posits it as an unavoidable part of everyday 
life.1 The first woman that everyone thinks of when women intelligence agents are 
mentioned is Mata Hari. Her figure can be interpreted as the classic ‘controlling image’ 
of modern day women intelligence agents. These ‘controlling images’, and among them 
the sexualized, exoticized image of Mata Hari as the traitor spy woman determine the 
way we think of women working for the intelligence corps. Hers was the image of the 
somewhat loose, frivolous woman, whose peculiarities justified her exclusion from the 
intelligence services. A researcher of the topic, Rosie White argues that Mata Hari’s trial – 
who has been recently rehabilitated – served an entirely different social purpose. White 
holds that the trial was an attempt to fix Mata Hari’s disturbing mobility within the 
normative system of sexual and imperial relations. With the end of the First World War 
the norms of femininity and masculinity had to be redefined and the type of femininity 
represented by Mata Hari had no further purchase: her independence as well as the fact 
that she had historical agency had to be retaliated in order to reinstate the traditional 
patriarchal rule.2
The controlling images constructed of women working for intelligence services gra-
dually boiled down in the literature to three stereotypes as number of women increased 
in intelligence gathering: the lustful, wanton dancer; the self-sacrificing, noble spirited 
woman patriot; and the woman who seeks revenge for the death of a loved one or for lost 
property.
During the Cold War’s technological rivalry, Soviet intelligence deployed women to 
acquire information from men with secret technological expertise.3 The often used 
concept of ‘honey trap’ speaks volumes about our modern-day expectations towards 
gender roles in intelligence gathering. It was at this moment that the ‘controlling image’ 
of the ‘good looking Soviet woman agent’ became associated with sexual espionage. 
1Patricia Hill Collins, “Mammies, Matriarchs, and other Controlling Images”, Black Feminist Thought? Knowledge, 
Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (New York, Hyman, 1990), 67–75.
2Rosie White, “”You’ll Be the Death of Me”: Mata Hari and the Myth of the Femme Fatale”, The Femme Fatale: Images, 
Histories, Contexts. Helen Hanson and Catherine O’Rave eds., (New York, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 74.
3Open Society Archives (Further OSA) holds a box from Radio Free Europe Archive HU-OSA 300–40-1 with newspaper 
clippings about deconspired agents.
2 A. PETŐ
According to a monograph devoted to the topic, Soviet intelligence services gathered 
compromising information through for instance placing fake nipples on honey trap 
women, with microphones attached to wearable batteries charged using body heat. 
Whatever the microphone picked up was transmitted to the interceptors over the 
walls, where it got recorded, since no one expected the women spies to be able to retain 
the information even.4 Certainly these stories contributed to the further strengthening of 
the image of the ‘good looking Soviet woman spy’. According to this image these women 
are pretty, and their bodies are potential sources of danger, but they themselves are 
incapable of analyzing data, in other words: they are not real professionals even in 
a country officially supporting women’s emancipation.
Cold War dichotomy is also reflected in how ‘controlling images’ were used in the two 
major intelligence services. Another ‘controlling image’ relates to the family members of 
male intelligence agents: the wives and children are handy informants. American women 
spies were also expected to be the embodiments of traditional femininity as opposed to 
a communist subversion of gender roles.5 While in the public discourse the Soviet 
women spies were presented either as sexualized femme fatales or as merciless, soulless 
devices of the system, the American women spies were depicted as good mothers and 
wives who dutifully returned to the homestead after having saved the nation. Further, 
sexuality was part of the job and the service, and ‘honey traps’ were used both for 
blackmailing and for data collection. The framework of sexuality in this context was 
not necessarily heteronormative.6
As I argued in this section women are present in intelligence work as ‘controlling 
images’. Intelligence work has an additional special feature to any other profession: 
sexism and gender-based discrimination are constitutive parts of it which makes the 
gendered analysis challenging. The deployment of femininity as ‘Otherness’ is part and 
parcel of the trade itself and the result of deliberate decisions of obtaining information. 
Intelligence work is a complex, structured process, within which the directing, support-
ing, and executive functions require different skills and expertise. Therefore, the hier-
archy within the profession and the possibility of progress are determined by gender 
hierarchies, thereby making sexism and gender-based discrimination intrinsic parts of 
intelligence gathering process on all levels.
Context: history and sources of gendering Hungarian intelligence services
The history of intelligence is usually analyzed in a framework of institutional history, 
which all too often conceals the generic features of intelligence work discussed in the first 
section. In this section I give an overview of the history of Hungarian intelligence services 
and how this history determines the accessibility of its archives today.
As a successor state after the collapse of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, the 
Hungarian secret services were organized under the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry 
4David Lewis, Sexspionage. The Exploitation of Sex by Soviet Intelligence (New York, Heinrich Hanau Publications, 1976).
5Veronica Anna Wilson, Red Masquerade: Gender and Political Subversion During Cold War, 1945–1963 (PhD Dissertation, 
Rutgers University, 2003).
6Hungarian intellegence services were using homosexuality in the process assigning informants Állambiztonsági 
Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára (State Security Historical Archives) (further ÁSZTL) 1.11. 2. series. 53. box 1981–82, 
1982–83, 1983–84, 54. box 1984, 1985, 1986.
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of Defense: the sections focusing on military intelligence and counter intelligence. This 
structure existed till 1945. Their archival material were archived by the Ministry of 
Interior and the Ministry of Defense which were heavily damaged by the war and now 
gives only a glimpse of the work executed there.
The files of those agents or field officers who were reemployed after 1945 are available 
in the State Security Historical Archive (Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára: 
ÁSZTL) which hosts all, partly accessible material related to military and civil intelligence 
and to counter intelligence. The newly organized, communist controlled State Security 
Department of the Ministry of Interior was staffed with Soviet advisors, and it provided 
also special services for the Military Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense acting 
as Military Secret Service. The former agents and officers or the former handlers if 
decided to stay in Hungary, they tried to continue their services collaborating with the 
new communist regime after 1945. The State Protection Authority (renamed in 1947) 
acted as an independent ministry till 1953. After 1956 revolution the intelligence services 
were reorganized and from 1962 the 3rd department of the Ministry of Interior was 
working on intelligence and counterintelligence divided by 4 subsections including one 
on military intelligence till 1989.7
When I started the research this article I interviewed colleagues working on history of 
intelligence ensured me that there is not much accessible material about the topic. It is 
true that nobody sofar has researched the history of intelligence from a gender perspec-
tive but with a reason. Those who wanted to convince me that this topic is not worth 
researching were party correct as the material I was given by the reference archivist is 
sporadic but surprisingly insightful to understand gender bias of intelligence work.
I will examine the gendered aspects of intelligence work analyzing all files available for 
research in the Military Archive and the State Security Historical Archive (ÁSZTL) in 
Budapest.
The processes determining the situation of Hungarian research and the accessibility of 
sources have been widely discussed.8 The early documents of security/intelligence ser-
vices were destroyed during WWII and the documents of the pre-1989 period is still 
difficult to access.9 The Open Society Archive has an extensive press collection about 
cases covered in the national and international press.
However, the picture that the accessible archival files provide is haphazard. This is 
partly because we can only know about the cases that made it into the media as the finest 
professional details were never recorded on file. So, it may occur that the researcher from 
the vantage point of her current knowledge projects an interpretation onto a story, which 
in its own time was meant to be a smoke screen. Thus, the conclusions we may draw out 
of singular cases are only suitable for outlining tendencies.
The successful informants are those we don’t know about. The national and interna-
tional press coverage of mostly failed intelligence operations can be found in the Open 
7Summary is based on Felderítő Szemle (Intelligence Review) Vol 17. No. 2. 2018 http://www.knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/ 
fsz/2018-2.pdf (Accessed August 1, 2019) and Jagadics Péter, Rajos Sándor, Simon László, Szabó Károly: A magyar katonai 
elhárítás története 1918–2018, (History of Hungarian military counter intelligence) KNBSZ/Metropolis Media, Budapest, 
2018.
8See more “Main focus: The Secret Police Files of the Former Communist Countries,” Südosteuropa Mittelungen Vol. 5–6. 
(2011): 69–72.
9The terminology used in this article is about security services as military and civic intelligence services were united under 
the concept of security service.
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Society Archive (OSA) Budapest, in the Radio Free Europe clipping collection. It is not 
a coincidence that among the Open Society Archives’ press material about detected 
agents of the Hungarian intelligence services there are many women. They held the 
lowest positions and at the same time performed the riskiest work: the transfer of data 
from one place to the other.10
The main sources of this paper are from the ÁSZTL. Doing research in ÁSZTL means 
that the researcher is assigned a reference archivists who is preparing the archival 
material after consultation with the researcher as no openly accessible catalogue of the 
collection is available. The personal chemistry between the archivist and the researcher 
fundamentally influences the research outcome. I was given files with female agents and 
handlers which have been read by other researchers before, so they have been previously 
screened together with training manuals, statistical report about women in the 
Hungarian intelligence services and recruitment files. What follows is the analysis of 
these documents after discussing the methodological challenges.
Methodological challenges
In this paper based on documents available about Hungarian intelligence gathering I am 
arguing for are three methodological problems of gender analysis of history of secret 
services.
First is that historians invest serious effort into reconstructing the way intelligence 
worked in particular cases. Each case was unique and it is difficult to generalize. This 
approach becomes even more problematic if we take the gender of information in 
consideration. For instance, what determines the relationship of a male liaison officer 
and a woman agent (or very rarely a female liaison officer and a male agent), or what 
determines whether an agent was described as pretty, attractive, representative or ready 
for sexual encounters, cannot be deduced from the files. There are no written documents 
to rely on. Rather, it is only the informal conversations of the decision-making men 
within intelligence that offer a starting point. Intelligence services replicate the values of 
the society they are embedded in and operate via their reflection and exploitation. 
Therefore, it is difficult to analyze the intelligence work of the Cold War because the 
system of genders was very different then not to speak about the official gender regime of 
the communist states. That is why the in-depth knowledge of the inner logics and value 
systems of Cold War institutions is indispensable for this research; without it the files in 
which women appear could remain invisible forever.
The next challenge is posited by the amount of information. ‘To know everything about 
everything’ is what a July 1969 report states as the goal of Hungarian intelligence services.11 
This universalized approach to intelligence work posits a methodological issue for the 
researcher. As I pointed out in the previous section only a fragment of the information 
survived, and whatever survived is not necessarily accessible for research. Even if it was 
accessible for research it most probably would not be sufficient for reconstructing a case, 
because although the information is available, the decisions that were made based on the 
10OSA HU-OSA-300-40-1, in 135.10 the case of Erika Ossendriver and in 135.101. the case of Hingyi Henriette.
11OSA HU-OSA 300–40-4. Box 5. 1878/69 report.
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information are not. In other words, the picture that could be pieced together by the chosen 
few from many different files is beyond the researcher’s reach.
The third challenge is that ‘cognitive closure’ which occurs when the brain receives new 
information that is in discord with information received earlier, and as a result it cannot 
process both. This phenomenon entails behavior as well, which is shaped by tradition and 
previously acquired knowledge.12 For example, intelligence work is ‘Herrendienst’, and in this 
framework everything that relates to women but does not signify them as the dichotomous 
‘Other’ is unprocessed. This ‘cognitive closure’ explains the lack of research and the 
unchangeable character of repeating ‘controlling images’ instead of analyzing how they 
were constructed and what purpose they play. The law regulating scientific research protects 
sensitive data, for example information about sexual orientation cannot be disclosed for the 
researcher. Therefore, the researcher cannot trace how the object of her research, in other 
words, how sexuality was defined, deployed, manipulated, not even in those documents that 
she has access to. Only anonymized files can be accessed, the rest will be available only beyond 
the term of protection determined by law, that is, thirty years after the death of the subject; or 
if the date of death is unknown, then ninety years after the date of birth. Therefore, 
paradoxically it is exactly the secrets of the intelligence services that protect them even 
today from the disclosure of data about their operation. Thus, ‘cognitive closure’ itself 
comes to a closure: women were not only unrecognized actors, but even today it is impossible 
to write about their stories, exploitation, manipulation – in protection of their privacy rights.
Recruiting women employed by Hungarian intelligence services till 1945
The process how women became paid employees of intelligence services is connected to 
conceptualizing women as ‘controlling images’. No matter that the character of intelli-
gence work has changed due to technical developments, the staff employed there 
followed the same gendered principles.
The First World War brought along major changes in the history of European 
intelligence services. For the first time there was such a mass need for information that 
it transformed the profession and structure of intelligence. Until then, the intelligence 
services sector only recruited from a pool of men working for the military or for 
diplomatic services, all from prestigious families and with the appropriate financial 
background. Analyzing the foundation of the British, the Belgian and the French 
intelligence services, Tammy M. Proctor showed that recruitment primarily happened 
through family connections.13
Family relations played an important role later as well, since the family members of 
these men often got involved in intelligence work themselves. Furthermore, those few 
women with elite education who were recruited for their own expertise – and not as 
someone’s relatives – were also from known and trustworthy families. Not only was 
loyalty towards the family seen as a prerequisite of loyalty towards the homeland; but 
also, those men who established the foundations of professional intelligence work – most 
12Constant Willem Hijzen, „The Perpetual Adversary. How Dutch Security Services Perceived Communism (1918–1989)”, 
Historical Social Research Vol. 38, No. 1 (2013):171.
13Tammy M. Proctor, “Family Ties in the Making of Modern Intelligence,” Journal of Social History 2005 (Winter): 451–466. 
Stella Rimington was assigned to MI5 also this way see Stella Rimington: Open Secret (London, Hutchinson, 2002).
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of them with backgrounds in the colonial army – considered that through family ties they 
could keep these otherwise unreliable and emotion-driven women under control.
These early years made a lasting, perhaps still lingering effect on the way the women 
workforce has been recruited by the intelligence services. In the services’ internal 
patriarchal order women were defined as assistant workers, controllable and to be 
controlled through emotional connection. Additionally, there were of course women 
who were considered ‘usable’ as ‘spy courtesans’, but as no respectable woman would 
have ever taken these tasks, those conducting it were symbolically placed outside of the 
existing patriarchal order as ‘the Others.’
The First World War the previous unwritten rules of recruitment to ‘Herrendienst’. 
During the First World War, gathering information from behind enemy lines, for 
instance the oversight of railroad traffic, was only possible via personal presence. The 
securing of communication and the processing, archiving, and evaluation of incoming 
data was done by women too, chiefly because the male work force was simply lacking. 
After 1919, as men returned from the battlefields, most women working for the intelli-
gence services were dismissed.14
We also have information about the recruitment practices of the Gestapo before 1945. 
Hitler considered that the intelligence sector should primarily employ women, ‘especially 
blasé high-bred women hungry for adventure, seeking thrills’.15 Based on this we can 
conclude that women who joined the intelligence sector did so partly to acquire a measure 
of agency in a male dominated world, but the quote also illustrates the profession’s elitism. 
For women suffocated by a middle class existence or feeling trapped in the closed confines 
of social space, the mystery of intelligence work was presumed to be attractive.
Aside from their family connections and social standing, women’s involvement in 
intelligence services was determined by another factor: their looks. During the Second 
World War the American airmail censor station on the island of Bermuda had exclu-
sively women employees, and the recruitment requirements were fluency in a European 
language and nice ankles.16 In her memoires the first female head of MI5, Stella 
Rimington also mentioned nice legs as a selection criteria of MI5 – while men had to 
have the invaluable skill of being capable to take notes on their handcuffs while horse 
riding. Stella Rimington herself was recruited as the university educated, bored, destined- 
for-more wife of a trustworthy clerk in the foreign affairs.
About the Hungarian intelligence services’ recruitment pools we can learn directly 
from the notes of István Újszászy (1894–1948), the former chief of intelligence. The notes 
were made while he was held captive by the ÁVH (the Hungarian State Protection 
Authority), therefore their source value is dubious.17 The lists put together by the former 
chief of intelligence show that most of the recruited women were either typists or 
actresses, whose specific skills and greater social connections could be used in informa-
tion acquisition. The second largest group comprised of the wives of aristocrats and 
statesmen, who had access to embassies or had an international nexus. The third group 
14Proctor, Family Ties, 462.
15Jacques Delarue, A Gestapo története (Budapest, Kossuth, 1972), 198.
16Quoted in Christopher Lee Phillips, “How Bermuda’s ’Censorettes’ Made a Nest of Spies Disappear,” World War II January 
(2004): 20.
17Vallomások a holtak házából. Újszászy István vezérőrnagynak, a 2. vkf. Osztály és az Államvédelmi Központ vezetőjénekaz 
ÁVH fogságában írott feljegyzései. szerk. Haraszti György. (Budapest, Corvina, 2007).
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consisted of women who owned or managed popular meeting places where information 
was exchanged or where targeted men could be compromised.
The entire process of intelligence work (recruitment and deployment) takes place in 
a gendered space. The following cases are typical of the working of Hungarian intelli-
gence services in the Second World War.
The first type of recruitment is of an atypical Jewish expert spy. Mrs. Szánthó, a Jewish 
mine owner from Egeres (Aghireş, Kolozs county), whose mine was taken away ‘with 
well-known Romanian methods’ had only the Hungarian authorities to turn to for 
remedy. Therefore, while she was traveling around Transylvania, she regularly reported 
in letters to Elemér Gyárfás (1884–1945), the president of the Hungarian People’s 
Community of Romania (Romániai Magyar Népközösség), although no document 
proves that Mrs. Szánthó was assigned the task of traveling and reporting. Once 
Mrs. Szánthó reported that on the train she got in a conversation with a young 
German engineer who was traveling to Ploeşti, where a German gasoline factory was to 
be built. Elemér Gyárfás later integrated this information into the back-up material 
prepared for the meeting of the Romanian and the Hungarian ministers of foreign affairs, 
with an attached comment according to which Mrs. Szánthó should be treated carefully 
because of her ‘family interests, Jewish relations and subjective emotions’. Despite these 
precautionary measures on Gyárfás’ side, the information about the increased German 
industrial expansion in Romania had already appeared as a fact in a letter that was later 
sent to Budapest. In other words, the conversation in the railroad compartment may have 
affected the Hungarian side’s position in high-level state negotiations.18 Of course, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was certainly not solely relying on Mrs. Szánthó’s report when 
establishing the Hungarian strategy. It is important to remember though that neither the 
number of ‘Mrs. Szánthós’ working for Hungarian intelligence services, nor the way the 
various information made its way to the decision makers can be reconstructed today, 
because the materials of the General Staff are not publicly accessible.
A different type of a recruited woman is exemplified by Mrs. Arz, born Vilma Jakabffy. 
Although her father was a Supreme Court Judge, she ran a dance school, and fit perfectly 
the type of a desired woman spy described by Hitler. She belonged to the ethnic 
Hungarian minority in Romania, which provided both the opportunity and the financial 
constraint to collaborate with Hungarian intelligence services. In Transylvania, she 
recruited a Romanian lieutenant, who fell in love with her, later she married an 
Austrian officer. When the Romanian authorities arrested her in 1936, she escaped to 
Hungary with the help of the Hungarian consul László Bárdossy but was soon sent back 
with a new task in 1940. From that time on she ran a pub in Oradea. Her daughter, also 
a dancer, married an American lieutenant in 1949. From a not very benevolent report 
about Mrs. Arz we can gather what features were seen to make a woman suitable for 
working in the intelligence services: ‘She is proud of her noble ancestry [. . .] adores 
money. She wouldn’t think twice to sell the corpse of her mother and her homeland. For 
her espionage is a business. She had previous experiences with similar activities in 
Romania [. . .] a loose-moraled woman prone to dirty negotiations, and though elderly, 
still lecherous. Very selfish, terribly lazy, she hates to work. She is not without talent in 
her profession though, as she is a creative, witty, sharp person who understands and loves 
18Hadtörténeti Levéltár (Military Archive), 38/A VII. 125 Gyárfás Elemér, Personalia, 55.
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music. She is superstitious, religious; she is a fortune teller, a mystique.’19 In 1952 the 
Hungarian services wanted to recruit her once again, and in exchange they promised her 
that her Budapest-based dance school might remain open. She did not comply, so she was 
interned until 1953. No more information is available on her. Whether she took tasks 
which involved sexual encounters and if so, why, is unknown, as there are no sources 
available.
The third type is contradicting to the popular image that all female spies should have 
great bodily features. When Elena Endrődy (codenamed PE-2) was approached by the 
Hungarian intelligence services in 1949, because of ‘material reasons and 
adventurousness’20 she did not reject them. As a colorful and not unproblematic person-
ality – for instance she was fond of alcohol and for a while she was a morphinist –, her file 
is thick. Coming from a circus artist family she was a well-traveled polyglot. Her 
husband, with whom she had a daughter, was the military attaché of the Chinese 
Embassy in Rome in 1944. According to the available sources, when PE-2 was recruited, 
her daughter lived in Milan. Although she was ‘barely if at all familiar with the funda-
mental principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology’, the Hungarian intelligence services still 
enrolled her because ‘she was naturally sharp witted and an excellent observer’. In 
addition, she spoke Italian fluently among other languages, which is why in 1949 the 
intelligence services installed her by an Italian man whom they suspected to have 
connections with the Italian intelligence services. Her task was to escort the Italian 
who dutifully took pictures of Hungarian military objects. Elena herself was also under 
surveillance, as is apparent from a report attached to her file which recorded her 
disappearance with the Italian in some bushes in the middle of a military observation. 
Elena had already proven her capabilities once before when she reported on Italian youth 
visiting the World Festival of Youth and Students in Budapest also in 1949. Hence, after 
her encounter with the Italian she was rapidly trained for foreign deployment. Her 
personalized training consisted of the study of the task and the enemy, counter espionage 
practices, learning to forge connections, secret writing (with lemon juice), practicing her 
cover identity, and a final briefing.21
PE-2 did not comply with the ‘controlling image’ of ‘sex-spying’: she was short, 
smoked 40 cigarettes a day, one of her arms was crippled because of a gunshot from 
a former lover, and at the time of her recruitment she was already approaching old age. 
According to her self-portrait – which every enrolled person had to submit – she had 
severe attachment problems but wanted to appear self-confident: ‘I like being courted, 
I especially like making a fool out of them, this is how I protect myself. As soon as I notice 
that they start to take it seriously, I get bored. If I somehow happen to fall in love, he 
would never know it, because by the time he’d found out I would have cut ties with 
him.’22 On the summer of 1949 Elena went to Vienna. There is a thick file of correspon-
dence available until 3 May 1950 when her liaison officer suggested cutting ties with her. 
His reasoning was that ‘she did not complete her task’, in other words, she did not 
provide any valuable information, though she kept on mooching the Hungarian autho-
rities for money. Also, drunk in Vienna pubs and restaurants she revealed that she was 
19ÁSZTL Report V-27 October 6472, 1952, 13.
20ÁSZTL K-558. Endrődy Elena 7. Report on 8 September 1949.
21Ibid., 8.
22Ibid., 11.
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a Hungarian agent, and one night, drunk again, she threw stones on the local Hungarian 
Embassy, shouting that they should let her in because she wants to report immediately.23 
It is unclear whether PE-2 became an agent because this was her only way to obtain 
a Hungarian passport to replace her expiring Chinese one, and to visit her daughter using 
state money, or whether she was already recruited by other services before the Second 
World War. We have one more document though: her file was re-opened on 
11 April 1967 when a Hungarian soldier stationed in the vicinity of the Yugoslavian 
border promised her in a letter that he would help her leave the country through 
Yugoslavia.24 Her colorful story illustrates the career course of the intelligence services 
before it changed it character to a mass industrial enterprise.
The three cases illustrate another methodological challenge of gendering intelligence: 
the interesting and colorful cases can always bring only a glimpse on the events which are 
difficult not only to generalize but due to lack of other sources even to verify. We know 
about the three cases as they represent a transition from pre-1945 hiring methods to post 
1945 period which party changed the rule of the game.
Hungarian intelligence services and its employed women by after 1945
Two interconnected trends had a significant effect on the role women played in intelli-
gence: the post-1945 change of the political elite in Eastern Europe, and, due to the 
support of the new egalitarian ideology the growing presence of women on the job 
market. Both Újszászy’s list and the three earlier analyzed examples demonstrate the joint 
presence of continuity and change in Hungarian intelligence after 1945. Furthermore, 
files from the State Security Historical Archives (ÁSZTL) show that during the establish-
ment of the new intelligence services, the State Security Services reached out (or rather 
back) for agents who – according to the General Staff’s documentation – had been 
successful before.
The change of elites was accompanied by the transformation of the intelligence 
services. The ‘Herrendienst’’s staff completely transformed, which also entailed the 
democratization of the profession in a particular sense. Many of the women whom 
they previously employed – aristocrats, wives of politicians – either left the country or 
became the potential targets of recruitment abroad, or they became targets, or sometimes 
even paid agents of the reformed Hungarian secret police.
From 1945 onward, more and more women became part of the intelligence services 
from employees and informants to technical personnel and trainers. Still, sexism, or 
gender based negative discrimination was and remained a core element of intelligence 
work. We can even say that the effectiveness of intelligence work at the time was 
dependent on the practical effectiveness of sexism. Intelligence work was bound by its 
own strict rules and regulations, and in a way the intelligence corps was above the 
government. At the same time the rules concerning women were not fixed, and as 
I will argue later, because the ‘woman’ was perceived as the ‘Other’, she became subjected 
to increasingly boundless and uncontrolled, direct and indirect power, shaped by the 




Since the Second World War the technique and technology of information acquisition 
underwent fundamental changes. While at the beginning of the 20th century personal 
presence and the transfer of information was significantly challenging, with today’s 
technologies, information acquisition does not necessitate personal presence; it may be 
done in front of the computer as a 9 to 5 office job. Similarly, while during the Cold War 
the Bulgarian truck drivers detected military objects as they drove their loaded trucks on 
Western European highways, today’s satellites can transfer a detailed and reliable image 
of a palm-sized territory to any part of the globe, the analysis of which is done as a regular 
white collar job. In addition, before the invention of the internet, the writing of secret 
messages with hidden ink and their delivery was among the hardest of tasks, while today 
anyone with the right set of skills can send an email from an encrypted address.
The Hungarian intelligence services, just like any other intelligence service, strictly 
and hierarchically divided all tasks, primarily in order to protect the anonymity of 
participants. At the same time, this hierarchical order was, just like in every other job, 
a gender based hierarchy too.
The informants were at the bottom of the pecking order; those doing studies and 
research came next followed by the surveillance and executive personnel. The higher we 
look the less women we find. Women filled narrative reports, in other words they 
responded to previously posited questions, after which they received another instruction 
from above. In most cases they had no knowledge about how the information they 
handled fit into a larger plan, or where the report would end up. Almost all the 
instructions these women received came from men, who also trained them based on 
previously acquired knowledge about them.25 The most important element of training is 
impact, which has a significant role from the point of view of gender: men train women to 
perform certain tasks26 with methods that ‘objectify their thinking’ in the framework of 
an educational plan.27 There are anecdotic stories circulating about how certain liaison 
officers used the K-apartments (apartments for conspiration) for casual encounters with 
women, and that certain liaison officers had a preference for women agents that they 
could approach sexually. All this proves that women as a gender were on the one hand 
invisible, while on the other hand it was exactly their gender that put them in undignified 
positions.
Information was also gathered about foreigners living and active in Hungary, such as 
the employees of various consulates and cultural institutions. They were mainly men, 
except for an employee of the American Embassy’s Cultural Department, Ruth Tyron. 
Most probably she was placed to Budapest to act as a ‘honey trap’ and collect information 
from Soviet officers, but when she fell in love with one she was immediately recalled.28 
Apart from the ‘honey traps’, cleaning women and the Hungarian women employees of 
the consulates (such as typists), as well as their own compromised or bored or perhaps 
adventure-seeking wives could become sources of danger.
25ÁSZTL A-3860, A hálózati személy vezetéséről (How to handle agents) (1974), 174.
26Ibid., 55.
27Ibid., 108.
28Összefoglaló jelentések az imperialista kémszervezetekről. (Summary report of imperialist spying agencies) ÁSZTL 1.5. II/ 
41. Afj7 353/7. 3. box 18.
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A report dated 30 June 1966 details the situation of the Ministry of Interior’s ‘women 
network’ as well as the specificities of its staff; furthermore, it also captures the complex-
ities of the staff’s composition.29
70% of the 879 women working for the Ministry of Interior were agents or informants, 
while the rest were involved in the upkeep of the so-called T-apartments, the apartments 
for secret meetings. 795 women were recruited on patriotic basis; 42 joined the ranks 
because they were politically incriminated, and another 42 because they were morally 
compromised. About half of the latter 84 women were employed in county units, 
primarily in the field of criminal investigation.30 Of the 879 women employees, 473 
worked for counter espionage (296 for III/III, i.e. the Hungarian State Protection 
Authority’s counter inside reaction division), 138 for other counter inside reaction 
services, 26 for the legal authorities, and 132 in the armed forces. Only 16,7% of them 
were already employed before 1956; while 31,8%, that is 280 women, were recruited in 
1964–65.31
The age composition: of the 879 women, 14 were under 20, 142 between 21–30, 235 
between 31–40, 259 between 41–50, 228 over 51. This age composition does not support 
the requirements of ‘honey trapping’, rather it indicates a crew of dutifully working 
middle aged and older women. 691 of the 879 women were not members of the Party. 
When it comes to education, 546 finished only elementary school, 56 had a university 
degree. 41% of them spoke a foreign language, 183 spoke one, 76 two, and 76 multiple 
languages. With such an educational attainment structure, these women’s position on the 
labor market was quite unfavorable: 18% had a leading position, 29% worked as a clerk, 
and the rest of them were manual laborers. 28% of them had traveled abroad before 
mainly to Austria and West Germany, which is where they had connections. Only 140 of 
them had some interest or expertise that could have been useful from an operational 
point of view, such as painting, archeology, tourism, languages etc. Most women 
employed by the Ministry of Interior were far shots from the expectations of the 
‘Herrendienst’, so it is no surprise that when a particular intelligence task emerged, the 
service was on the lookout for a woman with language skills, personal mobility, readiness 
for ‘sexual encounters’, and who is ‘good-looking’, ‘makes a pleasant impression’, or is 
downright ‘strikingly attractive’.32 The responses to these inquiries consisted of 5–10 
names long or even longer lists from the records office, even when the service sought an 
athletic, well-spoken man to accompany a woman who appreciates icon painting.33
The other source of gender politics of the Hungarian secret services are the recruit-
ment files which contain the most important personal data about the recruited, such as 
their characteristics, skills, connections, health status, the modus of their recruitment, 
their circumstances, level of preparedness, level of surveillance, usefulness etc., also 
contain categories such as ‘ready to dye it to any color (category 17), strikingly attractive 
(18), plain (19), ugly (20), has a bodily defect (21), limb amputated (22), hard on hearing 
(23), nearsighted (24), abstinent (27), alcoholic (28), likes to drink with measure (29), 
homosexual (or other sexual aberrations) (30), prostitute (31), ready to be sexually 
29ÁSZTL 1.II. 10/2 series 5. item. 52. box.
30ÁSZTL 1. II. 10/2 series 5. item. 52. box 3. Out of 58 recruited because of previous history in sex work.
31While between 1945–1949 14 were admitted, 1950–1954 98, 1955–1956 35, in 1957 40, in 1958 71, in 1959 76.
32ÁSZTL 1.11. 2. series. 53. box 1981–82, 1982–83, 1983–84, 54. box years of 1984, 1985, 1986.
33ÁSZTL 1.11. 2. series. 54. box 1983–84, 5.
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involved (32), and addictions that would hinder their work as an agent (33)’.34 When the 
service sought a person for a particular job, the agent was chosen based on these 
numbers. The list clearly indicates the system’s heteronormativity as well as its readiness 
to instrumentalize sexuality. No source clarified how it was determined whether someone 
was a (32), but the likelihood of finding such a source is extremely low as I pointed out in 
the section analyzing available sources.
Analyzing training manuals during Cold War
‘Gender heterogeneity’, as the working relationship between men and women was 
termed at the intelligence services, was not addressed directly in intelligence files. This 
has multiple reasons. During the Cold War intelligence work was seen as a rational, plan- 
based, controlled process in which gender plays no role unless a woman is being deployed 
in the position of the sexualized ‘Other’. Female identity was officially ignored, but 
present in practice and in informal conversations based on the most rudimentary 
stereotypes. The official communist ideology did not differentiate between men and 
women, though it ensured women’s equality in the constitution. In the meantime, the 
everyday praxis was based on a system of values rooted in petit bourgeois morality, thus 
women faced discrimination both on the job market and in their families.
Women as employees obtained a more visible role either when they had a specific skill 
(mostly a language skill), or when they were part of a network: they were related to a man 
important in or for intelligence services, or if they had a job through which they had 
access to certain information (bartenders, secretaries or cartographers). Besides these 
factors, their bodily characteristics and their age was always of importance.
One of the valuable sources of analyzing gender regime of Hungarian intelligences 
services are the training manuals kept in ÁSZTL. In the agents’ training manuals, 
‘communist morality’ was emphasized as the one that should determine the expectations 
towards the handling of ‘gender heterogeneity’. This above all fostered consciousness as 
a leading concept, as well as normativity paired with idealism, since ‘communist mor-
ality’ was meant to be one part of a binary dichotomy where on the other side is capitalist 
morality in which everything is for sale. Although ‘communist morality’ should have 
regulated the system of relations created around ‘gender heterogeneity’, all protocol 
aside, the relationships were primarily following the social praxis. In this framework 
any information related to sexuality was informal, yet tabooed, and at the same time 
instrumental.
The training of women agents was usually a task-focused ad hoc training. They had to 
learn to keep the given task in focus while performing the cover activities, and to pass on 
and receive information without being detected.
The training was different depending on the different levels of intelligence services. 
According to the training manual, the relationship of the recruited person and their 
operations officer was ‘paternal’, the basis of which was 'mutual trust and 
understanding'.35 The operations’ officer passed on the ‘general behavioral norms, 
methods and tools connected to the execution of the task’.36 At the same time his 
34Kenedi János, „Tévedtem–Utóirat a besúgottés a besúgó közti levélváltáshoz”, Élet és Irodalom, 6 February 2004.
35ÁSZTL A-3860, A hálózati személy vezetéséről (1974), 34.
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‘statements have to make an impact on the reason, emotions and will of the recruited 
person.’37 This ‘impact’ in 1977 was based on autosuggestion and Freudian teachings, as 
well as accessible Western literature too.
The recruitment and training of youth was a special concern, because their ‘sexual 
desires and the possibility of their fulfillment is different’, they are ‘more emotional’ and 
more susceptible to romantics.38 This is why they rather recruited more mature people, 
whose characteristics were listed as follows: ‘the life period of level-headed, reality-based 
optimism, greater social ambitions, larger network, strict self-command, manlike for-
titude of will and self-control.’39 Of course we can assume that there are women with 
manlike fortitude of will, but the description unambiguously is of masculinity – 
a masculinity that is defined in relation to the ‘Other’, that is, woman.
‘What is the character of their social emotions, do they prefer solitude or company? In 
relation to their emotionally tinted social tendencies are they dominant, submissive or 
balanced? How social are they in their emotional adjustment?’40 The intelligence services 
constructed its own jargon, in which love was an ‘emotionally tinted social tendency’, 
while another criteria of recruitment, dancing skills were: ‘the measure of efficiency when 
resolving emotionally directed motion based tasks; the style of movement; the economic 
alignment of the synchronized movements (of the hands or potentially the arms and 
legs)’.41
The aim of information gathering is the ‘influencing of the enemy person as 
necessary’,42 in which ‘gender heterogeneity’ – or in case of homosexuals gender- 
homogeneity – played an important role. By the training manual these processes should 
have followed ‘operative methods that comply with socialist law and does not offend the 
Party’s political relations with the masses’.43 In praxis the technique of information 
acquisition was independent from political systems.
The concept of ‘controlling images’ is again useful if we want to understand how the 
Hungarian intelligence services handled women. The reports I read in the past years by 
and on female spies during communism in Hungary clearly show that the work environ-
ment – where sexuality was used as a tool – was considered to be a different space than 
the spy’s private family circle where she was expected to follow heteronormative petit 
bourgeois values. An interesting contradiction of gender politics of communist 
Hungary.44
Based on the analysis of Hungarian training manuals for officers stationed abroad 
accessible at ÁSZTL, in Hungary, the systematic training of the agents’ wives had begun 
in the late 1970s. From these specially prepared training manuals, spy wives could not 
only learn about the specificities of the given country, but also how to cook in ‘Hungarian 
style’, i.e. which ingredients are unavailable in the given country.45 The wives of profes-
sional intelligence agents were often employed at embassies or at the intelligence services 
37ÁSZTL A-3118. Rapcsák Mihály, Pedagógiai és pszichológiai ismeretek. (Budapest, BM Tanulmány és Propaganda 
Csoportfőnökség, BM III/1, (1977), 42.
38Ibid., 82–83.
39Ibid., 85. (My emphasis P.A.)
40Ibid., 100. (My emphasis P.A.)
41Ibid., 105.
42ÁSZTL A-3860. A hálózatiszemélyvezetéséről, 51.
43Ibid., 54.
44Andrea Pető, “A Missing Piece? How Women in the Communist Nomenclature are not Remembering,” East European 
Politics and Society Vol. 16. No. 3 (2003): 948–58.
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where they could help with time-consuming chores such as coding. The children of 
intelligence officers were also sources of information as they participated in the life of the 
local community, through for example attending schools where they could acquire 
information about their classmates’ parents.
The older, college age children were often targeted by enemy intelligence services. 
Although as wives and daughters, women often performed unpaid or part-time embassy 
work, and as such, they participated in data gathering, they did so in a space honored and 
protected by men. Within military intelligence women were not integrated in substantive 
tasks till as late as the 1990 s, because military training, a basic prerequisite for serving in the 
military intelligence, was inaccessible for them. Professional intelligence agents had to have 
a normative, heterosexual family life: ‘Must be exemplary in his devotion and steadiness to 
uphold his marriage, as well as his family should be the school book example of a socialist 
family. Must feel responsible to maintain the socialist spirit and lifestyle in his family. Must 
raise his children to become valuable members of our socialist society and true campaigners 
of socialist ideology and society’.46 The family members of installed agents were well aware 
of the profession of the family head, so in case of detection they knew exactly how to 
behave – like the wife of the Hungarian trade counselor of Rome, who sat in a car with her 
two children and was never seen afterwards.47 Family relationships followed heteronorma-
tive expectations and thus for women the family was their primary field of agency.
As more and more women became sources of information, another change occurred. 
Only a few women worked in leading positions beforehand, which meant that most 
women targets were the secretaries of influential men. Plus, as we have already men-
tioned, the intelligence services attempted to recruit the women relatives of significant 
men – sometimes by compromising them. This is how the Stasi’s Operation Romeo was 
conceived: the handsome East German agents used middle aged, single women working 
in the West primarily as secretaries for information acquisition.48
The manual made for the counter inside reaction division thus defines what should be 
paid attention to: ‘characteristics of the person: is he a smoker (what kind and how many 
cigarettes per day), amount of alcohol consumption, relationship to money, appreciation 
of women, passions, hobbies (sport, tourism, horse racing, fishing).’49 This shows that the 
agents were not prepared for women targets. This source is also important because it 
represents what elements of masculinity were considered important from the point of 
view of the intelligence services.
For counter insider reaction the family members of the source could also have signifi-
cance, so they placed an agent by the children of the target too. In Tamás Szőnyei’s seminal 
two-volume work on the Kádár-era literary life’s state security dimensions only one woman 
(Katalin Imre) is mentioned as someone who was targeted by the secret police on her own 
right and not as the relative or romantic liaison of a targeted man.50 No matter that socialist 
46ÁSZTL A-3118. Rapcsák Mihály, Pedagógiai és pszichológiai ismeretek. (Budapest, BM Tanulmány és Propaganda 
Csoportfőnökség, BM III/1, 1977), 21.
47OSA HU-OSA 300–40-1. 11 November 1967, RFE Report.
48Mark Mazetti,”The Coldest Place in the Cold War,” US News and World Report, 27. 1. 134. 3. (2003): 63.
49ÁSZTL A-3922, Bálint István and Gergely Attila: A hálózati operatív játszma az ellenség megtévesztése (Rendőrtiszti 
Főiskola, Budapest, 1979), 35.
50Szőnyei Tamás, Titkos írás. Állambiztonsági szolgálat és irodalmi élet, 1956–1990. I–II. (Budapest, Noran, 2012) Vol. 1. 
1035–1109.
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Hungary officially advocated for women’s emancipation very few women were holders of 
valuable information which was a reflection on their limited power.
A central issue of the era was that of Soviet influence or control over Hungary. In the 
name of the ideology of equality the Soviet intelligence services had already trained 
numerous women agents between the two world wars, with which they gained 
a significant advantage over other intelligence services. The analyzed Hungarian training 
materials often includes translations from Soviet manuals, but from the 1970s on they 
started to sample from Western literature too, they also relied on the most current 
Hungarian literature, e.g. in the field of social psychology. In lack of accessible archival 
sources we simply cannot know in what way the recruitment practices of Soviet intelligence 
services, considered to be the best secret service at the time, influenced the Hungarian 
recruitment process. Memoires are available but they should be used with extreme care.
Conclusions
The ‘Herrendienst’, the secret trade of men, was built on defining itself in opposition to 
the ‘Other.’ However, this ‘Other’ was continuously changing and increasingly acquired 
space within intelligence. ‘Cognitive closure’ explains why it is that although the intelli-
gence services had more and more paid women employees, this did not bring along the 
questioning of sexist logics underlying the expertise required for the profession. In 
communist Hungary officially dedicated to women’s emancipation intelligence services 
did not make any efforts neither to promote women nor to eliminate undignifying 
situation of women. This article, the first survey analyzing available sources like press 
coverage, personal files and training manuals, and methodological challenges was the first 
step to acknowledge this fact.
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